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THE DMCA: A MODERN VERSION OF THE
LICENSING ACT OF 1662*
L Ray Patterson**
I. INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this Article is that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA)I in the United States is a modem version of the Licensing Act of 16622
in England. The English censorship statute is sufficiently obscure to merit an
explanation of why the similarity and why it makes a difference. The reasons can
be simply stated. The statutes are similar because they represent the same goals:
the control of access to ideas. The similarities make a difference because a legal
construct to control public access to ideas undermines-aand will eventually
destroy-the right of free speech, the foundation of a free society. The Licensing
Act and the DMCA are such constructs with one major difference. Under the
Licensing Act, the persons given the power to determine what materials could be
made accessible to the populace were public officials acting for the government;
under the DMCA, they are private copyright holders acting for themselves as the
beneficiaries of the copyright monopoly.

* Editor's Note: Two proposals to amend the DMCA were introduced in the House of
Representatives on October 2d and 3d, 2002 Both "The Digital Choice and Freedom Act" (H.R.
5522) and "The Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act" (H.R. 5544) were drafted in part to amend
the anticircumvention provisions at section 1201 of Tide 17.
One of the stated goals of the Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2002 [hereinafter DCFA
is to "restore the traditional balance between copyright holders and society, as intended by the 105th
Congress, [which enacted the DMCAI." The DCFA notes in part that section "1201 has been
interpreted to prohibit all users- even lawful ones- from circumventing technical restrictions for
any reason .... [and that als a result, the lawful consumer cannot legally circumvent technological
restrictions, even if he or she is simply trying to exercise a fair use or to utilize the work on a
different digital media device." H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. (2002) (citing UniversalCity Studios, Inc. v
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
Similarly, in introducing the Digital Media Consumer's Rights Act [hereinafter DMCRA],
Representative Boucher stated that the enactment of the DMCA "dramatically tilted the balance in
the Copyright Act toward content protection and away from information availability." 148 CONG.
REC. E1761 (extensions of remarks ed. October 4,2002) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
** S.J.D. Harvard 1966, LLB. Mercer University 1956, M.A. Northwestern 1950, A.B. Mercer
University 1949. Mr. Patterson is the Pope Brock Professor of Law at the University of Georgia
School of Law where he teaches Copyright Law, Legal Profession, and Legal Malpractice.
' 17 U.S.C. § 1201 etseq. (2000).
2 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33 (Eng.).
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This difference would seem to give the advantage to the Licensing Act for
effectiveness, but the perception is misleading. The political purpose that led to
the Licensing Act was narrower than the profit purpose that led to the DMCA.
The goal of the English statute was to deny public access only to "heretical,
schismatical, blasphemous, seditious and treasonable" works.' The goal of the
DMCA is to substitute for the public's right of free access to published material
the duty to pay a license fee whenever the material containing ideas is digitized.
The motive behind the earlier statute was political, while the motive behind the
contemporary statute is economic, which explains why the former was concerned
with substance, and the latter with form. The significance: The concern for
substance limited the material to be censored to a particular subject (e.g., religion),
but the concern for form extends to all material in the protected format whatever
its subject (e.g., a popular song or a Shakespeare play).
The political motive also tends to result in less efficient control than the profit
motive since money is a more attractive goal than political oppression. More
importantly, the money goal serves as a camouflage for the use of copyright as a
tool of censorship because private censorship is considered to be a means of
protecting one's property. The preliminary question is whether private censorship
to protect private property is as objectionable as public censorship to protect a
state religion. The answer must be yes, because censorship makes intellectual
property a commodity for the marketplace. Intellectual property is a lawyer's
euphemism. Ideas, and control of access to ideas that copyright represents is
censorship whatever the mechanism or motivation; and since censorship is
forbidden by the First Amendment,4 the ultimate question is whether copyright
used as a tool to protect ideas as private property is excused as an exception to the
constitutional right of free speech.
The argument here is that it is not, and the reason is two fundamental, but
seldom noted, propositions. One is that the Free Press Clause and the Copyright
Clause are complementary, not contradictory. Therefore, to use copyright as an
excuse for censorship by anyone, public official or private citizen, is contrary to
both clauses. And the excuse that one's own speech is private property immune
from strictures of the First Amendment is a fallacy. One's speech ceases to be
private property when it is published, for the essence of a free press is the right
of the public to read, which is the reason to protect the right of the press to print.
The other proposition is that the complementary nature of the two clauses
depends upon the proprietary reach of copyright. A copyright limited to the
marketplace promotes access, while a copyright extended to the classroom, office
or home inhibits access. The history of copyright demonstrates the point.

3

13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33 (Eng.).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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During the time when copyright was a plenary property right in the nature of fee
simple property, it was a tool of censorship. When copyright became a limited
property right in the nature of an easement, it became a tool of learning. The
purpose of this Article is to explain these developments.
In Part II, I present the background of the problem; in Part III, I show the
similarity of the Licensing Act and the DMCA; in Part IV, I discuss the
proprietary base of copyright in the Licensing Act; in Part V, I discuss the
proprietary base of the statutory copyright created by the first English copyright
statute, the Statute of Anne in 1710; in Part VI, I discuss the proprietary base of
copyright that the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress
to grant; and in Part VII, I explain how Congress enlarged the proprietary base
of copyright in the 1976 Copyright Act.
II. THE BACKGROUND
Most everyone would agree that from today's vantage point, the Licensing Act,
having been contrary to the freedom of religion, would be deficient as a matter
of public policy and constitutional law. That a seventeenth century English
statute was characterized by unsound policy, however, does not mean that a
similar twentieth century American statute suffers the same fate. Times change,
and modem political, technological, and economic conditions may justify the
kinship of the two statutes. The United States Constitution guarantees freedom
of religion,' the personal computer has made the protection of copyrighted
material more problematic, and the free market system prevails. And there is a
difference between saying that government officials may protect a state religion
by control of access and that a person may protect his or her property by control
of access.

Those who would argue that the DMCA is a legitimate exercise of Congress'
copyright power, however, face the problem of the copyright dilemma. If a
copyright holder can control access to the copyrighted work, logically it is because
he or she owns the work. But since the essence of a copyrighted work is ideas,
it follows that to own the work is contrary to the principle that one cannot own
ideas. The ostensible choice is between ownership of the work, which would
inhibit learning, and free use of the work by everyone, which would also inhibit
learning (for the lack of a market).
Historically, the copyright dilemma was manifested in a controversy as to the
length of the copyright term. The publisher class wanted a perpetual copyright,
while the user class wanted a limited-term copyright. The publishers had the
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advantage of historical precedent, because for some 150 years, from its beginning

in the sixteenth century to the end of the Licensing Act in 1694, copyright was
treated as a perpetual right.6 But this was a matter of self-interest, not logic.
Copyright was created by publishers, and the government was not concerned that

the publishers claimed copyright as a perpetual property, but that copyright be an
effective tool of censorship; a perpetual copyright was a much more effective tool

for this purpose than a term copyright.7 Consequently, the government was not
concerned with the proprietary nature of copyright so long as it was consistent
with the scheme of copyright as a tool of censorship. It was after the government
ceased to be interested in using copyright for purposes of censorship that
Parliament, in 1710, enacted a copyright statute providing for a limited copyright
term. The reason for the change from a perpetual to a temporary copyright was
almost surely Parliament's concern about copyright as a monopoly. But the
booksellers, as the publishers were then called, sought to obscure this point by
arguing that copyright had a source superior to Parliament. Copyright, they said,
was a natural law right of the author by reason of creation and was in fact a
perpetual common law right that superseded the temporary statutory copyright.'
The unarticulated premise of the booksellers was that the source of a right
determines the scope of that right. Since the common law courts customarily
created, but did not limit rights, at least as to time, the common law copyright was
without temporal limitation, which meant that it was perpetual. The premise was
more a reflection of the custom of the common law of defining the rights of the
parties before them than reason. Despite the booksellers' natural law argument,
there was nothing natural about the exclusive right of a mortal author to publish
his or her writings in perpetuity. But that, of course, was not the point. The
corporate bookseller would be entitled to the perpetual copyright as the assignee
of mortal authors, and the advantage of the perpetual copyright was that it

6

See LYM

RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORiCAL PERSPECIVE (1968) for a detailed

treatment of the history of copyright.
' Seeogxenem id The partnership between the publishers and the monarchy lasted until the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which ensured the Protestant succession to the English throne and
thereby eliminated the need for official control of the press. In the meantime, the publishers had
created a copyright that was a primitive form of the natural law copyright. It was a perpetual right,
but it was derived from the registration of a title in the company register book by a member of the
company, not from a creative act The author was not eligible for the stationers' copyright. Id
8 See g~ema!/ A TRANSCmiPT OF THE REcisraEs OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF
LONDON: 1554-1640 A.D. (Edward Arber ed., 1875) [hereinafter ARBER]. Arber noted the
continual petitions of the booksellers for greater power and control of their copyrights. During the
Interregnum, for example, the booksellers petitioned Parliament for legislation to replace the Star
Chamber Decree of 1637 that expired with the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1640. The
booksellers argued that without press control legislation, "Many Pieces [sic] of great worth and
excellence will be strangled in the womb, or never conceived at all for the future." Id at 587.
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increased the value of the property. Thus, the booksellers were seeking to use the
author's natural law copyright argument to gain a personal benefit, at the public's
expense. Had the campaign for a perpetual copyright succeeded, William
Shakespeare's works today would be subject to the copyright monopoly.
Reflection demonstrates that one of the oddities of copyright jurisprudence
is the persistence of the idea that copyright is a natural law right of the author
because he or she created the copyrighted work. The seed for this idea was
planted, watered and fertilized by the booksellers in their efforts to revive the
perpetual copyright as a common law copyright to defeat the limitations that the
Statute of Anne had placed on their monopoly. The oddity is that copyright as
a natural law right of the author is contrary to the public interest purposes of
copyright that the statutory copyright protects. Thus, the copyright of the Statute
of Anne promoted learning, protected the public domain, and provided for public
access. An author's natural law copyright would have been anti-learning, would
have destroyed the public domain, and would have been anti-public access.
The weakness of the natural law theory of copyright is that it is a disguise for
self-interest in the guise of public interest. Certainly this was true when the
booksellers in the eighteenth century argued that the courts should create a
perpetual common law copyright based on natural law.9 The surprising thing is
not that the booksellers ultimately failed, but that they almost succeeded. They
achieved their goal of a judicially created perpetual copyright in a 1769 King's
Bench decision, Mi/arv. Taylor,"° but their victory was short-lived. A 1774 House
of Lords decision, Donaldson v.Beckett," overruled Mi//arandlimited the copyright
holder's rights after publication to those granted by the copyright statute.
The statutory theory of copyright prevailed in this country for some two
hundred years, partly because it was embodied in the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and partly because during this period there was relatively little
development of communications technology prior to the advent of television and,
later, the personal computer. Moreover, the technology that developed was seen
as being related primarily to entertainment-motion pictures, recordings of
musical compositions, and radio-which was not deemed to be very high on the
scale of intellectual values. The fiction was that the expansion of the copyright
monopoly to afford protection to works in these media would do little harm to
the learning purpose of copyright. Entertainment entrepreneurs encouraged this
" When the grandfather clause of the Statute of Anne ended after twenty-one years, the
booksellers applied to Parliament in1735,1738, and 1739 for a longer term of years or for life. "The
truth is, the idea of a common-law right in perpetuity was not taken up till after that failure in
procuring a new statute for an enlargement of the term." Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837
(H.L. 1774) (Lord Chief Justice DeGrey). See cases cited infra notes 10 and 11.
1098 Eng. Rep. 201 (KB. 1769).
1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L 1774).
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attitude, which was obviously to their advantage, by lobbying Congress and
litigating their rights. The point the entrepreneurs obscured, of course, was that
entertainment, viewed as being an intellectually lightweight enterprise, formed a
large part of American culture, the nature of which gives it an importance to rival
the importance of learning to-be gained from books, the paradigm of copyright
protection.
The piecemeal progress of communication technology resulted in a stealth
campaign to enhance the copyright monopoly that, by and large, has succeeded.
The 1909 Act" created the recording right, and in 1912 Congress added motion
pictures to the compendium of copyrightable works, 3 but by and large radio
broadcasts were unprotected as such. The revolutionary change came with the
enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act." In order to protect the interests of
television and computer entrepreneurs, Congress disregarded the Copyright
Clause and its first cousin, the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment.
Properly interpreted, the Copyright Clause limits Congress' copyright power
to the grant of copyright as a market monopoly for published works for a limited
time. In the 1976 Act, Congress extended copyright to the moment of fixation,
which eliminated the publication requirement; it divided the publication right into
two rights, the right to copy and the right to distribute copies publicly, and it
codified the right of fair use in such a way as to give copyright holders a weapon
to enhance the copyright monopoly further. They have been successful because
the proprietary base of copyright determines the scope of the copyright
monopoly. A copyright that is a plenary property right is a more comprehensive
monopoly than a copyright that is a limited property right, and because property
is a monopolistic concept, the fact that an increase in the property right enlarges
the monopoly goes unnoticed.
My theory as to why Congress failed to act within its constitutional restraints
is that the members knew not what they were doing. They were implementing the
natural law copyright under the guise of copyright as a plenary property right.
There are three parts to the theory: First, in England the natural law copyright
was a plenary property right that both Parliament and the House of Lords in its
judicial capacity rejected in favor of the statutory copyright; second, the English
statutory copyright was adopted by the Founders, embodied in the U.S.
Constitution, and prevailed until the 1976 Copyright Act; third, the natural law
theory of copyright has been revived in the guise of a plenary property right, of
which the DMCA is the exemplar.

Act of Mar. 4,1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended and codified in 17 U.S.C. § 101 eSq.).
Townsend Amendment, Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488.
14 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (2000)).
12
13
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The enactment of the DMCA, because of its similarity to the Licensing Act,
provides an occasion to examine the impact of the English statute on American
law. The most useful insight this examination reveals is that two provisions of the
U.S. Constitution can be attributed to the English policy of press control as
manifested in the Licensing Act; one directly, the -other indirectly. The two
provisions are the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause.
III.

THE SIMILARITY OF THE LICENSING

ACT AND THE DMCA

The similarity of the Licensing Act and the DMCA is seen in those provisions
intended to control the manufacture of, and trade in, materials that would enable
one to do the forbidden act, that is print unlawful material or gain unlawful access
to digitized material.
The English statute provided:
[t]hat no joyner, carpenter, or other person shall make any printing
press, no smith shall forge any iron-work for-a printing press, no
founder shall craft any letters which may be used for printing for
any person or persons whatsoever; [nor import or buy materials]
belonging unto printing, unless he or they respectively shall first
acquaint the . . . master and wardens of the . . . company of

stationers... for whom the same presses, iron work or letters are
to be made, forged, cast brought or imported...
The DMCA provides that "[n]o person shall manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product; service, device,
component or part thereof, that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title."' 6
There is even some evidence that the legislators in both London and
Washington were dubious about the desirability of the statutes they enacted. The
Licensing Act contained a proviso "[t]hat this act shall continue and be in force
for two years, to commence from the tenth of June, one thousand six hundred
sixty and two, and no longer."" The DMCA provides that the "[v]iolations
[r]egarding [c]ircumvention of [t]echnological [m]easures" shall not take effect

's
16

Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, § X (Eng.).
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2)(A) (2000).

11 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, § XXV (Eng.). The statute was renewed. 16 Car. I, c. 8 (Eng.), 1 Jac.
11, c. 17, § XV (Eng.).
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until two years after the enactment of the statute.1 " Moreover, the American
statute mandates triennial studies to determine whether users of a copyrighted
work are, or are likely to be, adversely affected by "the prohibition under
subparagraph (A) in their ability to make noninfringing uses under this title of a
particular class of copyrighted works.
The common concern for controlling the manufacture of, and trade in,
materials of communication technology is striking evidence of the similarity of the
goals: to control access to learning materials. The most subtle similarity between
the two statutes, however, is that copyright is a secondary consideration in both.
The Licensing Act made the infringement of copyright as much of an offense as
publishing a book without an imprimatur, but copyright was not available for
unlicensed material. Although the DMCA is codified as part of the copyright
statute, it does not specifically limit the materials available for encryption to
copyrighted works. The primary concern in both statutes, in short, was and is
what is communicated, although the criteria and motives differed. The Licensing
Act was concerned with substance, that is with "heretical, schismatical, blasphemous, seditious and treasonable" material,-' the DMCA was concerned with form,
that is encrypted material.
The remarkable similarity of statutes separated by three hundred years in
different countries, one governed by an autocratic monarchy, the other by elected
officials, is best explained, perhaps, by the law of motivation, which is that
motivation for the same goal tends to produce similar actions. The motivation
for the Licensing Act and for the DMCA was the same: to control public access
to publicly disseminated material. Although for different reasons-politics in
England, profit in the U.S.-the motives produced ideas that resulted in the same
means, control of dissemination in order to control public access to what was
disseminated. The emphasis on control of access is highlighted by the title of the
Licensing Act, "An act for preventing abuses inprnting seditious, treasonable, and
unlicensed books and pamphlets, andfor regulatingofprinting andpring-presres."'
While the statute made it illegal to print and sell "heretical, schismatical,
blasphemous, seditious and treasonable books, pamphlets and papers,"' it
contained no provision relating to the writing or composing or reading of such
material. The target was the publisher, the link that provided access of writer to
reader and vice versa. Similarly, the DMCA has no provision relating to the basic

1817 U.S.C. S 1201(a) (2000).
1917 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(1)(c) (2000).
20 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, S I (Eng.).
22

IId (emphasis added).

d
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condition for copyright, originality, and no recognition that materials in the public
domain can be encrypted along with copyrighted material.
One difference between the two statutes is that the Licensing Act precluded
any access to forbidden materials because without publication, the material was
not accessible. Under the DMCA, digitized material presumably is available for
a fee, which ostensibly makes it less threatening than the Licensing Act. Persons
with this view, however, overlook two points. The first is that not all people will
have the coins to make the turnstiles turn. The second is that the real issue here
is power, and Lord Acton's dictum remains valid: "[p]ower tends to corrupt, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely."'
IV. THE PROPRIETARY BASE OF THE LICENSING ACT COPYRIGHT

The Licensing Act codified the extant copyright and thus was a copyright as
well as a censorship statute. Section III of the Licensing Act provided "[t]hat no
private person or persons whatsoever shall at any time hereafter print, or cause
to be printed any book or pamphlet whatsoever, unless the same.., be first
entered in the book of the register of the company of stationers of London..."24
This condition for printing was consistent with censorship because it provided
authorities with a record of who printed what. The Act, however, also provided
the right of exclusive publication (the essence of copyright) in Section VI, which
read.

And be it further enacted ...That no person or persons shall...
imprint or cause to be imprinted.., any copy or copies, book or
books, or part of any book or books,... which any person or
persons ... by force or virtue of any entry or entries thereof duly
made or to be made in the register-book of the said company of
stationers... have or shall have the right... solely to print, without
the consent of the owner or owners of such book or books, copy
or copies,....2s

The copyright that was codified in the Licensing Act was a private law
copyright of the Stationers' Company, the London Company of the booktrade.
23 ROBERTANDREWS,THECOLUMBIADICIONARYOFQUOTATIONS 511 (1993) (quotingLord
Acton in Letter, 3 Apr. 1887, to Bishop Mandell Creighton).
24 13 & 14 Car. 1I, c. 33, S III (Eng.).
21 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, § VI (Eng.). The provision also provided protection for the printing
patent, a copyright that was granted by the sovereign for a fee that existed in addition to the
stationers' copyright. The Printing Patent was not significant in the development of copyright
jurisprudence.
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The early copyright was a stationers' copyright in both function and name since
it was limited to members of the Company.26 It had existed for over a century
when the Licensing Act was enacted, and one of the many ironies of copyright is
that despite its current status as a concept to protect authors, it was created by
tradesmen as a means of maintaining order among themselves in the conduct of
their business. The business was the booktrade (from which authors were
excluded) and the tradesmen were printers and publishers (called booksellers). An
odd set of circumstances gave workmen the power to create copyright, one of the
most far reaching legal concepts in history and, arguably, one that is essential for
a free society because of its impact learning. The two most influential circumstances were the introduction of the printing press into England by William
Caxton in 1471, and the religious schism created by Henry VIII's break with the
Roman Catholic Church in the 1530's in order to divorce Queen Katherine, the
mother of the future Queen Mary, and marry Anne Boleyn, the mother of Mary's
half-sister, the future Queen Elizabeth I.
The first event resulted in a new type of business-the booktrade-and the
second was the reason the tradesmen were given a monopoly power to regulate
their business. In 1556, Philip and Mary granted a royal charter to the tradesmen
called stationers to create the Stationers' Company, a London Company with
unprecedented power to control the publication of books. As a Catholic intent
on returning her subjects to the fold of the Holy Mother Church, Mary
recognized that an unregulated press was an obstacle to her goal. She also
recognized that making the printers and publishers beholden to her by vesting
them with the power to control their trade was the most efficient means to keep
"heretical, schismatical, blasphemous, seditious and treasonable" books out of the
hands of her subjects.27 To this end, the stationers were given the power to
search out and destroy illegal presses and burn illegal books.
This historical note is important because it explains the proprietary basis of the
original copyright. It was in the nature of a fee simple property because it was
created by tradesmen. But while the stationers presumably were sophisticated
businessmen in a sophisticated society-this was after Chaucer and includes the
time of Shakespeare and Milton-the proprietary basis of copyright was almost
surely a practical, not a theoretical, concept. There was no need for them to be
concerned with theory because copyright law was the ordinances of the Company
and there were no competing rules. The Star Chamber decrees that preceded the

S"That the custom of endowing a stationer with the copyright of any work he could get hold

of, get licensed, and get entered in the Company's Register might work hardship to the author is
evident enough."

W.W. GREG, SOME ASPECS AND PROBLEMS OF LONDON PUBLISHING

BEiwEEN 1550 AND 1650 72 (1956).
2

13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, § I (Eng.).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss1/3

10

2002]

Patterson: The DMCA: A Modern
THE Version
DMCAof the Licensing Act of 1662

Licensing Act had merely confirmed the stationers' rules in the same way the
statute did. They were public law that supported the private copyright law of the
company, the only reason the censorship regulations were important to the
stationers.
The failure to articulate the proprietary basis of the stationers' copyright is
explained in part by the fact that the common law courts had no role in
developing the concept. Consequently, there were no judicial opinions providing
direct evidence of the nature of copyright as property. In the absence of direct
There is substantial
evidence, circumstances serve the cause of proof."
as having the
their
copyright
viewed
stationers
circumstantial evidence that the
of
copies;
for example,
to
the
ownership
characteristics of land ownership applied
ownership in perpetuity that could be assigned or devised.
Evidence of the proprietary base of the stationers' copyright begins with the
stationers' charter, which was granted to provide "a suitable remedy" against the
publication of "seditious and heretical books... daily published and printed by
divers scandalous malicious schismatical and heretical subjects ... ."" To this
end, it limited printing to members of the Stationers' Company or holders of
printing patents granted by the sovereign,' and gave the stationers the power to
"make and ordain and establish... ordinances, provisions, and statutes .... so
long as they were "not in any way repugnant or contrary to the laws or statutes
of this our kingdom of England. . . ."' And the Master and Wardens were
authorized "to imprison or commit to jail" anyone who "shall disturb, refuse, or
hinder" the Master and Wardens "in... seizing, taking, or burning" unlawful
32
books.
The charter thus created the foundation for a culture of censorship that lasted
for 150 years33 based on copyright as a fee simple property that, by definition,
existed in perptuity. A lesser property would have been less monopolistic and
thus less effective for tradesmen as policemen of the press for both censorship
This fact alone justifies the inference that the
and competitive purposes.'
28The difference between circumstantial and direct evidence is only that the former requires
more inferences than the latter (which is proof of itsel).
29 I ARBER, umpra note 8.
3° Id at xxxi
31 Id at xxx.
32 Id at xxxi.

" The continuation of the culture was assured when the Protestant Elizabeth I, who succeeded
her half-sister Mary in 1558, renewed the charter and continued the policies of press control, albeit
in support of a different faith.
' The stationers' role as policemen of the press proved to be a substantial benefit to them. To
facilitate that role, the sovereigns from time to time promulgated decrees of press control, beginning
with Elizabeth I's Injunctions of 1559. The most notable of these decrees were the Star Chamber
Decrees of 1566, 1586, and 1637, each of which produced increasingly restrictive control of the
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proprietary base of the stationers' copyright was in the nature of a fee simple
property, an inference supported by its two most important characteristics: it
existed in perpetuity, and it was freely alienable.3" There were two good reasons
for these characteristics. First, the sovereign was interested in copyright as a tool
of censorship, and its proprietary base determined the efficacy (and efficiency) of
copyright for this purpose. Obviously, a term copyright would end the license at
the end of the term while a perpetual copyright would continue the license.
Second, copyright as a fee simple property was a reward that encouraged the
stationers in their role as policemen of the press.
The ultimate test of the proprietary nature of the stationers' copyright is the
form it took and the services it provided. In form it was the ownership of a copy
(or manuscript) that entailed the right of exclusive publication in perpetuity. This
meant that there would be an owner for all time with the right of exclusive
publication, which, of course, entailed the right to prevent others from publishing
the work even if the copyright owner did not wish to do so.3" These characteristics meant that the stationers' copyright was a tool that could be used to deny
access, to prevent the development of the public domain, and to control learning.
More succinctly, the stationers' copyright was anti-access, anti-public domain, and
anti-learning. The use of copyright as a tool of official censorship makes this
obvious, but these truisms were lost when the statutory copyright replaced the
stationers' copyright as codified in the Licensing Act.
V. THE PROPRIETARY BASE OF THE STATUTORY COPYRIGHT

The statutory copyright created by the first English copyright statute, the
Statute of Anne, 7 made a seismic change in the proprietary base of copyright.
The perpetual copyright of publishers, the only condition of which was
registration in the Stationers' Register book, became a copyright with three
conditions: the creation of a work, the publication of that work, and an exclusive
press. The decree of 1637 was the last of the decrees because the Star Chamber was abolished in

1640, but it had a greater influence than its short existence would indicate, for it was revived in the
form of the Licensing Act of 1662, after Charles II returned to the throne. In the meantime, during
the Interregnum, Parliament had continued the policy of press control with the Ordinances of 1643,
1647 and 1649, despite John Milton's plea for a free press, Areopqgiticain 1644.

3s Copyright "was like an estate,.. . it was assignable,. .. [and] after publication, an author, or
his assigns, had an exclusive right inperpetuity of multiplying copies." Donaldson v. Beckett, 1Eng.
Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774) (Mr. Justice Willes).

6 There is, however, evidence that if a stationer did not publish a work he registered, the
Company would allow another stationer to print it. See GREG, $upranote 26, at 71 (discussing the
company's rule that if a copy were out of print, and the owner did not, after warning, reprint it
within six months, the journeymen of the Company should have leave to print it).
' 8 Ann., c. 19, S 1 (1710) (Eng.).
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right of publication for a limited term. The proprietary basis of copyright
changed from a fee simple property to a limited property in the nature of a
marketing easement for designated periods of time.
In summary, Section I of the Statute of Anne provided copyright for limited
property in the nature of an easement. There were three kinds of books: books
already printed and copyrighted (a grandfather clause), books composed but not
printed, and books "that shall hereafter be composed."' 8 The term of protection
for books already printed was twenty-one years, for the other two classes of
books, the term was fourteen years. The section also stated the rights of
copyright and defined infringement. The rights granted were "the sole liberty of
printing and reprinting" books; infringement was the printing, reprinting,
importing, selling, publishing or exposing to sale books without the consent of
the proprietor. 9 The penalty for infringement was forfeiture of the offending
works to the proprietor "who shall forthwith damask, and make waste paper of
them."' The offender also forfeited one penny for each offending sheet in his
possession. The monetary penalty was subject to a qui tam action, which meant
that anyone had standing to sue for copyright infringement and be entitled to
one-half of the recovery, the other half going to.the sovereign. 4
The statute also involved two shrewd political tactics: extension of the extant
stationer's copyrights for twenty-one years, and vesting of copyright in the
author.42 The first tactic mollified the booksellers, who would otherwise have
been chagrined to lose their perpetual copyright.43 The second placated authors
without objection from the booksellers because the new copyright was not
available until a book was published, which meant that the booksellers could
continue to be copyright owners as assignees of the author and therefore could
continue their control of the booktrade.
From today's perspective, however, the interesting point is that the Statute of
Anne is derivative of the Licensing Act of 1662. From the perspective of the
1710, this was natural, for the censorship statute was a source of ideas to provide
a framework for the statutory copyright. It was the only precedent available.
Even so, that a censorship statute was the source of a statute to promote learning
comes as a surprise and suggests the ease with which the latter can be corrupted

38

Id

39Id

4 Id
41

Id

42

Id

the extended term expired in 1731, the booksellers went back to Parliament for another
extended term and failed; they then turned to the courts in an effort to get a judicially created
perpetual copyright
43 When

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

13

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3
J. INTELL PROP.L
[Vol. 10:33
to return to its original function. The following analysis demonstrates the
rehtionship of the two statutes.
The Statute of Anne had eleven sections of which three were procedural,'
one was remedial," and one was original." The remaining six sections, including
section I, are evidence of the use of the Licensing Act. The qui tam action for
copyright infringement in section I had a counterpart in the Licensing Act. 7 The
Statute of Anne provided for registration of the title of a work "in the register
book of the company of stationers, in such manner as hath been usual," ' which
was the same procedure as in the Licensing Act. 9 The Statute of Anne required
copies of books for nine libraries; s° the Licensing Act required copies for three
51
libraries, the library of the King and of Oxford and Cambridge universities. S2
The Statute of Anne provided a scheme for controlling the prices of books
that was obviously patterned after the scheme for licensing books in the Licensing
Act. 3 Many of the same officials authorized to license books, for example, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, the Chief Justices of the
Common law courts and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, were the officials to
whom complaint could be made if the price of a book was too high. The Statute
of Anne also provided that it should not be construed to extend to prohibit the
importation of books in foreign languages printed beyond the seas.5 4 This
provision can be viewed as protection against any recidivistic conduct by reason
of the Licensing Act provisions that subjected the importation of books to the
control of the licensors ss and provided that no English books could be printed or
imported from beyond the seas. s'

" 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). Sections VI (granting jurisdiction of the Court of Session in Scotland);
VIII (providing for the plea of the general issue and special matter in evidence); and X (setting three
month statute of limitation).
's IU Section III (providing for alternative method for entry-by advertisement in the Legal
Gattite-if the Clerk of the Stationers' Company refused to register).
SId Section XI (giving the author the right to a renewal term if living at the end of the first
term).
'7 Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, §III (Eng.). A qm tar action for a criminal

statute, which is what the Licensing Act was in effect, is understandable; but there seems to be no
reason other than copying that it should be available for a tort such as copyright infringement.
8 Ann, c. 19, S 11 (1710) (Eng.).
,9 13 & 14 Car. 1I, c. 33, § III(Eng.).
so 8 Ann., c. 19, § V (1710) (Eng.).

5 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, § XIII (Eng.).
528 Ann., c. 19, § IV (1710) (Eng.).
5 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, §III (Eng.).
54 8 Ann. c. 19, § VII (1710) (Eng.).
55 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, § V (Eng.).
6 Id at § IX.
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The most arcane section of the Statute of Anne, however, provides the most
persuasive evidence of the use of the Licensing Act for drafting the copyright
statute. Section IX of the copyright statute read:
Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall extend, or be
construed to extend, either to prejudice or confirm any right that
the said universities, or any of them, or any person or persons have,
or claim to have, to the printing or reprinting any book or copy
already printed, or hereafter to be printed."7
Read literally, the provision makes no sense, because it negates the other
provisions of the statute. Properly interpreted, however, the section meant that
the statute was not "to prejudice or confirm" any printing patent, which was a
privilege of the exclusive right to print a particular book or books granted by the
sovereign. 8 Proper interpretation, however, was available only when the section
was read in light of two provisions of the Licensing Act, sections XVIII and
XXII. The former protected the printing patents of Oxford and Cambridge
Universities, the latter the printing patents of all patentees."s By 1710, apparently
the sovereign had ceased to grant printing patents, and there was no reason to
create a controversy over a moribund issue. And it should be noted that the
printing patent had no significant role in the development of copyright jurisprudence.
There is one further point about the Statute of Anne. The commonly
expressed idea that the new statutory copyright was an author's right (because it
vested initial ownership in the author) is misleading, because the beneficiaries of

s7 8 Ann., c. 19, § IX (1710) (Eng.).
s "Mhe saving clause could not refer to any common-law right, because... there existed no
common law right. It was merely a salvo to the Universities and all who held under letters patent,
which alone could in books or copies give a perpetuity." Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837
(H.L 1774) (Mr. Justice Gould).
s 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33, § XVIII read:
Provided always, That nothing in this act contained, shal. be construed to extend
to the prejudice or infringing of any of the just rights and priviledges of either of
the two universities of this realm touching and concerning the licensing or
printing of book in either of the said universities.
Section XXII read:
Provided also, That neither this act, nor any thing there in contained, shall extend

to prejudice the just rights and priviledges granted by his Majesty, or any of his
royal predecessors, to any person or persons, under his Majesties great seal, or

otherwise, but that such person or persons may exercise and use such rights and
priviledges as aforesaid, according to their respective grants; any thing in this act

to the contrary notwithstanding.
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the statute included the purchasers of copies. This meant that the benefits for the
author (except the renewal right) accrued to the author's assignee, that is the
publisher.' ° Even so, there was a little recognized value in vesting the initial
copyright in the author. The change protected works in the public domain from
being captured by copyright, because it made the condition for the statutory
copyright a new (original) work. The limited term, of course, meant that the
public domain would be enriched as copyrights expired.
Acceptance of the idea that the Statute of Anne created an author's copyright
is attributable mainly to the arguments of the booksellers-the most powerful
group in the booktrade and the 18th century counterpart to today's
copyrightists-in "The Battle of the Booksellers." This was the epithet applied
to a forty-year effort to get the courts to override the limitations of the Statute of
Anne by creating a perpetual common law copyright for the author based on
natural law. Using natural law as a premise, the lawyers for the booksellers argued
that the author, as creator, is entitle to ownership of his creation in perpetuity as
a matter of equity and justice.6' But the lawyers did not note that few authors live
in perpetuity, that corporate booksellers would continue as beneficiaries of the
author's natural law copyright as assignee long after the author's demise, or that
the natural law copyright would substantially limit, if not destroy, the public
domain.
The limited proprietary base of the statutory copyright can best be understood
by comparing ownership and term. A perpetual copyright for publishers was
changed into a temporary copyright for authors. The most important difference,
however, may be the new conditions for copyright: the creation and publication
of a work. These differences represent a change from a permanent to a
temporary property right, and when one analyzes the Statute of Anne, two points
become apparent. The statute was a regulatory statute that created the property
it regulated. In proprietary terms, the statutory copyright was a temporary
easement granted for a particular purpose-leaming-upon specified conditions-a new work, a limited term, and publication-that created and protected the
public domain.

See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201,205 (ustice Wiles).
S0

61See id at 252 (opinion of Justice Mansfield) stating-

[I]t is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own ingenuity
and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name, without his consent.
It is fit that he should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will publish.
It is fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication; how
many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will

trust the accuracy and correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will
confide, not to foist in additions: with reasoning of other the same effect.
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While an analysis of the language of the Statute of Anne makes this clear,

subsequent events created a new dimension that distorted the language. These
events were the efforts of the booksellers to revive the stationers' copyright in the
form of an author's common law copyright based on natural law. The efforts
were ultimately rejected, but they are very important in understanding the
proprietary base of the copyright that the Constitution in article I, section 8,
clause 8 empowers Congress to grant.
The booksellers actually achieved their goal in the King's Bench case of Mi/lar

v. Taylor,but their victory was likely more attributable to Chief Justice Mansfield,
who had been counsel for the booksellers, ruled in their favor and' than to the
merits of their claim. Indeed, the infirm logic of the booksellers' argument about
justice for the author explains the ultimate failure of their quest for a revival of the

stationers' copyright in the form of a perpetual common law copyright. The
House of Lords in Donaldsonv. Beckett' ruled that while the author does own the
work he or she creates, that ownership lasts only until publication, after which the
author must rely on the copyright statute for his or her rights. The House of
Lords thus created the common law copyright, which was merely the right of first
publication, not a true copyright, which was the right of continued publication.
The failure of the booksellers' campaign, however, should not be allowed to
obscure the impact of their arguments on copyright jurisprudence. That impact,
the popularization of the idea that copyright is an author's property, obscured the
fact that the Statute of Anne was a regulatory, not a proprietary, statute, and that
the statutory copyright was basically a regulatory, not a proprietary, concept. The
regulatory nature of the early statutory copyright is dearly shown by the ruling in
Donaldron v. Beckett that, except for the copyright statute, publication of a book
would put it into the public domain for anyone to publish. Logically, then, the
rights granted by the copyright statute had to be a matter of regulation, not
property.' Or to put the point another way, the regulatory aspects of copyright
were superior to the proprietary aspects.6 This is because the rights were
conditional.
Indeed, the genius of the Statute of Anne was that it changed copyright from
a proprietary concept for the exclusive benefit of the booksellers to a regulatory
concept for the benefit of the public. It did so by imposing four conditions: 1)
62It should be noted that the dissenter in MiIar, Justice Yates, had been counsel against the
booksellers.
63

1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L 1774).

"The argument as to the regulatory nature of copyright law in the Statute of Anne is clinched
by the price control provision of the statute. There is no dearer form of regulation than control of
the prices for books.
s The U.S. Supreme Court makes this point each time it rules, as it often has, that copyright is
primarily to benefit the public interest, the author's interest only secondarily.
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the condition of originality; 2) the condition of publication; 3) the condition of
registration of the title; and 4) the condition of a limited term. The Statute of
Anne thus rejected the anti-learning, anti-public domain and anti-access features
of the stationers' copyright and transformed copyright into a pro-learning, propublic domain and pro-access concept. The jurisprudential confusion generated
by the argument for the author's natural law copyright, however, obscured the
nature of these provisions. The confusion was created by the question of
whether they were conditions or requirements. The answer was legally significant
because conditions cannot be waived, whereas requirements can. The difference
is crucial in determining the scope of Congress' copyright power, for the
classification determines whether the Copyright Clause is a limitation on, as well
as a grant of, congressional power."
VI. THE PROPRIETARY BASE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COPYRIGHT
The words of the Copyright Clause are less than a model of clarity. "The
Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science . . by
securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ...
Writings .. ." The clarity is not improved by the fact that the words are in the
Intellectual Property Clause that includes Patent Clause. (Does "Times" refer to
both copyrights and patents so that each is entitled only to a limited time?)
Fortunately, the job of interpretation is facilitated by examining the source of the
language, the title of the Statute of Anne: "An act for the encouragement of
learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of
such copies during the times therein mentioned.""
An analysis of the Statute of Anne reveals three policies: the promotion of
learning because the language so stated; the protection of the public domain
because copyright required an original writing and existed only for a limited time
(the first condition meant that copyright could not be used to capture public
domain works and the second meant that all copyrighted works would go into the
public domain); and public access, because the exclusive right was only the right
to publish (the statute made publication a condition for copyright).
The fact that the Licensing Act of 1662 was a source of the Statute of Anne
explains why the three policies shared two characteristics: they were anti6 The U.S. Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet) 591 (1834), determined in effect
that the provisions are conditions.
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, d. 8.
6 The Statute of Anne used the plural "times" because the statute contained provisions for three
copyrights: the extant copyrights were extended for twenty-one years; copyright for books written
and not published and to be written in the future were given a term of fourteen years; and the author
was given a renewal term of fourteen years if living at the end of the first term.
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censorship and anti-monopolistic. A rational inference is that this was because
the Stationers/Licensing Act copyright had been a monopoly used as a device of
censorship. The most effective way to reject this dual role was to redefine
copyright's purpose as the promotion of learning and to impose three conditions
for copyright protection: a new work, a limited term, and publication. The most
interesting point about these policies, perhaps, is how well they are integrated as
a matter of logic. A condition for learning is access, and between these two
policies are the policies necessary for the public domain, the conditions of a new
work, and the limited term.
While history makes apparent the utility of the policies and their presence in
the Copyright Clause, copyright scholars have by and large ignored them. Two
reasons may explain this oversight. First, the promotion of learning literally
interpreted would require that a copyrighted work promote learning in fact. But
this would result in a content-based copyright and arguably make the copyright
statute a law regulating the press. (The requirement of a new (original) work was
consistent with this position.) History, however, provides the answer to this
conundrum. The promotion of learning was an anti-censorship policy and the
requirement for a new work was an anti-monopoly policy to protect the public
domain; the Licensing Act made both policies desirable, if not necessary.
The second reason for oversight of the policies is that copyright is so closely
identified as the property of the author that a larger purpose--protection of the
public domain-has been overlooked. Yet, it is clear that the requirement of an
original work and the limited term were protection for the public domain, and
arguably the public domain is more important for the promotion of learning than
the protection of original works.
The oversight of the copyright policies has been expensive in intellectual
terms, for the cost has been the failure to recognize that the policies are in fact
free press components of the Copyright Clause. The promotion of learning is a
free-press goal; the protection of the public domain is a predicate for a free press;
and public access requires a free press. These are lessons from the Licensing Act,
the most important of which is that the Copyright Clause complements, and does
not contradict, the Free Press Clause. This follows from the fact that, as the
Licensing Act demonstrates, the essence of a free press is the right of public
access. This is why the Statute of Anne made publication a condition for
copyright protection, for the Licensing Act was in fact a printing act to regulate
the booktrade in the service of religion and politics. Licensing was merely a
predicate for books to which access could be granted.
The DMCA, of course, provides the copyright holder control of access
without the need for an individual governmental license, except that copyright is
in fact a governmental license. Thus, the copyright statute, as did the Statute of
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Anne, "serves for an universal patent, and supercedes the necessity for an author's
applying for particular ones."
The function of the copyright statute is thus etymologically consistent with the
term license as "formal permission from a constituted authority to do something,"7' the exclusive right to multiply a work in copies. Lending credence to
copyright as a license is that in passing a copyright statute, Congress creates a
right, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Wheaton v. Peter." Thus, without a
copyright statute, the publication of a book puts it into the public domain, which
places the copyright statute in the category of a general licensing statute, that is,
it "serves as a universal patent." The authority that grants a license, of course, can
alter the terms of the license within the bounds of its authority to grant the
license, and Congress has consistently altered the terms of the copyright statute.
In 1790, Congress granted a single right, the right to publish a work; in the 1976
Act, Congress granted five (now six) rights" If copyright is the grant of license,
it follows that copyright holders are governmental licensees. This fact raises an
important question: is a statute that vests the power of censorship in copyright
holders as governmental licensees is a law regulating the press, or can Congress
do indirectly what the Constitution forbids it to do directly?73
VII. THE DMCA AND COPYRIGHT
The constitutional deficiency of the DMCA should now be apparent. Like the
Licensing Act in England, it is anti-learning, anti-public domain, and anti-access.
The DMCA thus represents a remarkable change from the pro-learning, propublic domain, and pro-access copyright the Founders empowered Congress to
provide. The important question is not whether the charge is correct (it is
axiomatic), but why. The answer is surprisingly simple. It is the proprietary base
of copyright. A plenary proprietary base for copyright has one set of consequences, while a limited proprietary base has another. Thus, the characteristic

69 "[Blefore the institution of the Stationers Company [authors] had recourse to the legislature
for a license, grant, patent, or privilege;..." Dold ro v. Be¢e#t, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
Congress has, on occasion, granted an application for an individual copyright
70 THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
71

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 660-69 (1834).
17 U.S.C. S 106 (2000).

826 (1966).

72
"' The fact that gives force to importance of the licensing argument is the subject of copyright,

which is speech, albeit in printed form. Presumably, when the Founders denied Congress the power
to regulate the press or speech, they did not intend that Congress delegate the power to copyrightists
in the interest of private profit This is why the Founders understood publication to be a condition
for copyright protection. To treat copyright holders as governmental licensees is merely a way of
saying that they have responsibilities as well as rights.
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that made the Stationers/LicensingAct copyright effective for both monopolistic
and censorship purposes was that its proprietary base was treated as being in the
nature of fee simple property.
But we do not have to resort to history to know this. Common sense tells us
that copyright as a fee simple property is anti-learning, anti-public domain, and
anti-access because the copyright holder has plenary control over another's use
of the work. The Second Circuit made the point crystal clear in Universal City
Stdios, Inc. v. Corky, upholding the constitutionality of the DMCA. Said the
Court:
[We must recognize that the essential purpose of encryption code
is to prevent unauthorized access. Owners of all property rights are
entitled to prohibit access to their property by unauthorized
persons. Homeowners can install locks on the doors of their
houses. Custodians of valuables can place them in safes. Stores can
attach to products security devices that will activate alarms if the
products are taken away without purchase.

In its basic function, CSS is like a lock on a homeowner's door, a
combination of a safe, or a security device attached to a store's
products.74
Surely the court did not recognize the import of its language. The DMCA
uses copyright law to give effect to the encryption code, and the court says in
effect that "the essential purpose of copqyght is to prevent unauthorized access"
for "[i]n its basic function, copyright is like a lock on a homeowner's door, a
combination of a safe, or a security device attached to a store's products.""5 In
this language, we see the ghost of the stationer's copyright brought back to haunt
the public domain and to thwart the constitutional purpose of copyright, the
promotion of learning. The error of the court was fundamental. It started with
an illogical premise and proceeded logically to an illogical conclusion. The faulty
premise was that copyright is property the same as a house, jewels to be put into
a safe, and items sold in a department store. The court's reasoning, of course, was
a product of the proprietary culture of the common law legal system.
A major value of copyright history is that it shows the shallow intellectual
treatment of copyright as property, primarily because of the law of self-interest,
74
7s

273 F.3d 429,452-53 (2d Cir. 2001).
See id (emphasis added).
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the basis of the booksellers' greed in the eighteenth century and of the
copyrightists' greed in the twentieth. In the beginning, the idea that copyright is
a plenary right in the nature of fee simple property is understandable. Those who
create a new proprietary concept give it as broad a reach as possible, especially if
the creators are tradesmen whose livelihood depends upon the concept they
create, as in the case of copyright. The fortuitous circumstance that printed
books became the basis of a trade in a time when unfettered learning was a threat
to the welfare of the state gave the members of the trade unusual power in the

development of copyright as a plenary property that existed in perpetuity. When
freedom of learning ceased to be a threat to the government, it became apparent

that copyright as a plenary property primarily served the publisher's interest and
disserved the public interest. The statutory copyright created by the Statute of
Anne was the legislative response: a copyright with a limited proprietary base.
The ruling in Donaldson v. Beckett that confirmed the limited proprietary base of the
statutory copyright was rendered in 1774,76 only thirteen years before the Framers
used the English statute to write the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
It is logical to assume, then, that the limited proprietary base of copyright in the
U.S. is constitutionally mandated.
The importance of recognizing that copyright is in fact a license is that it is a
special type license in the form of an easement. This follows from the fact that
the copyright license has a proprietary basis. While the copyright is a license, the
work that is the subject of the copyright license is subject to easements. Thus, an
easement is "a right held by one person to make use of the land of another for a
limited purpose, as the right of passage."' The fact that easement is defined in
terms of the use of land is an impediment to analysis only if form is more
important than substance. Thus, to recognize that copyright is an easement is to
avoid the inconsistencies that result from treating copyright as normal property
owned by the copyright holder. Normally, for example, property, whether real or
personal, is not subject to term limits or a fair use by others. As intellectual
property, copyright, of course, is not normal property, but the problem is that
copyright holders, in a classic example of wanting to have their cake and eat it,
too, insist on the right to protect their property to the exclusion of all other
factors. They often succeed because they treat their copyright as giving them
ownership of the work. Thus, they ignore the distinction between the copyright
and the work in order to control the use of the work as well as the copyright,

6

Eng. Rep. 837.

n THE RANDOM HOUSE DICnONARY, smpra note 70, at 449.
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despite the statutory recognition of the distinction." Thus, the easement theory
comports with the statute as well as common sense.
An easement is a use and for books there are three uses-a creative use, a
marketing use, and a learning or entertainment use-for which there are three
users-authors, publishers, and individuals. Authors use ideas, which are in the
public domain; publishers use the author's copyright (as assignees) to distribute
the work; and users use the author's work for learning and entertainment. The
subject of these uses, of course, is ideas: authors use ideas to write books,
publishers market ideas when they sell books, and readers acquire ideas when they
read books. This is why one of the basic principles of copyright law is that
copyright does not protect ideas, which must remain in the public domain free for
all to use without restraint. The public domain status of ideas is thus codified in
the copyright statute.79 Reason tells us that if one cannot own ideas, the
proprietary base for a copyrighted work that encompasses ideas (as they all do)
is not ownership but only a right of use, that is property in the form of an
easement. The easement theory thus explains the first sale doctrine, that is, the
author's marketing easement is exhausted with the sale of a copy of a book.'
The rule that copyright does not protect ideas is commonly attributed to the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. SedenW' in 1879, but in fact the idea that
copyright is property in the form of an easement is not a modem innovation. It
was the premise for the statutory copyright created by the Statute of Anne. The
statutory grant of an otherwise non-existent right that was conditioned upon the
writing and publication of a book and was limited in time could hardly be
characterized as property other than easement.8 2 Moreover, the regulatory nature
of the statute would have been negated if the proprietary base of copyright had
been in the nature of a fee simple property. 3
The question is: why was the easement theory of copyright lost? There are
two reasons: one historical and one contemporary. The historical reason is that
the efforts of the booksellers in the eighteenth century undermined the easement
theory with their arguments that copyright is a natural law right of the author.
The arguments, although rejected, were used in the opinions of the dissenting
justices in Wheaton v. Petere and thus became a part of American copyright
jurisprudence through the back door. The contemporary reason is the expansion
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (referring to ownership of copyright as "distinct from ownership of
material object in which the work is embodied").
79 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
Set 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
78

81101 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1879).
SSee 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
D See id
8

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834).
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of the proprietary base for copyright, which occurred in the 1976 Copyright Act.

There were two subtle changes (in that their impact was not realized), both related
to publication, that expandedthe copyright monopoly. The first was to eliminate
publication as a condition for copyright, which automatically extended copyright
protection to the moment of fixation. 5 The second was the division of the right

of publication into two rights-the right to reproduce in copies and the right to
distribute copies publicly. The first change enlarged the proprietary base of
copyright by eliminating a restrictive condition; the second multiplied the rights
of copyright by division. Both changes were made in disregard of the constitutionally based easement theory of copyright.

Without the enlargement of the proprietary base of copyright, the DMCA
could not have been enacted. And there is reason to believe that without the U.S.

adherence to international copyright treaties, even the copyrightists, for all their
pieces of silver, would not have been able to persuade Congress to enact

legislation that overrides the U.S. Constitution. While the copyrightists may be
greedy and cynical, no one has ever accused them of being stupid. Because the
Copyright Clause was an impediment to their goal, they pursued a strategy to
provide Congress with a substitute for the Copyright Clause. That something, of
course, was the WIPO Treaty. As the court in UniversalCiY Studios, Inc. v. Corky
explained:
The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty ('WIPO Treaty"),
which requires contracting parties to 'provide adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors in
connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the
Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works,
which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by
86
law.
Apart from issues of constitutional jurisprudence, the problem with using
international treaties as the source of Congress' copyright power, of course, is that
the treaties do not contain the protections for the public interest that are an
integral part of the Copyright Clause. The reason for the cavalier disregard of the
public interest is that the treaties are based on the natural law theory of copyright,
which was rejected for Anglo-American copyright in 1774. 1 The vice of the

8sSee 17 U.S.C. S 102 (2000).

8273 F.3d 429,440 (2d Cir. 2001).
87 Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L 1774).
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natural law copyright is that it is an author's plenary property right, which relieves
the copyright holder of any obligations to the public. While the beneficiaries of
the statutory copyright are the author, the publisher, and the user, the sole
beneficiary of the natural law copyright is the author.
VIII. CONCLUSION

If the U.S. Constitution is to be implemented with integrity in accordance with
the principle that the Copyright Clause is a limitation on, as well as a grant of,
congressional power, the unconstitutionality of the DMCA is beyond doubt. The
statute is a complete repudiation of the constitutional policies that copyright
promote learning, protect the public domain, and provide public access. The
DMCA thus returns to the anti-learning, anti-public domain, anti-access policies
of the Licensing Act.
Congress did not, of course, set out to emulate the English statute. The route
leading back to the policies of the Licensing Act was much more subtle. The
journey began with the 1976 Copyright Act, which was a codification of the
natural law copyright, a topic for another day. To accept the conclusion,
however, one need only compare the benefits the statute denied to the public with
those conferred on the relatively small class of copyright holders. Consider the
pattern of the statute, a grant of exclusive rights to the copyright holder, subject
to narrow limitations designed to protect the copyright holder while appearing to
benefit the public. Notice, for example, the fourth fair use factor in section
107-"the effect of the use upon the potenia/market or value of the copyrighted
work." There are few works that cannot be said to have a potential market in
addition to the actual market.
The change in the 1976 Act that paved the way for the DMCA, however, was
the transmission copyright that protects the live transmission of television and
radio broadcasts.' The DMCA represents the epitome of the transmission
copyright. It protects the work only by protecting the transmission, which is
directly contrary to the constitutionally mandated policy of public access by
publication.
The ultimate irony is not that the DMCA violates the Copyright Clause, but
that it violates the copyright statute. The copyright statute provides that "In no
case does copyright protection ... extend to any... procedure, process, system,

17 U.S.C. S 107(a) (2000) (emphasis added).

9 This result was achieved by several provisions of the statute. See 17 U.S.C. S 101 (definition
of "fixed" and "to perform'); S 102 (extension of copyright to work fixed in tangible medium of

expression); S 106 (performance right); § 411 (b)(allowing subsequent registration for transmission
works).
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[or] method of operation...," The only concerns of the DMCA are procedure,
process, system, and method of operation. Recall the language from § 1201(a):
"No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component or part thereof, that
is primarily designed to produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that controls access to a work protected under this title."'
Res ipsa loquitur.

17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.

1201(b) (2000).
1201(a) (2000).
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